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1. Introduction 
Preference foundations give conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a particular 
model and, thereby, allow assessing the empirical content of a model. The conditions that 
are identified can serve to justify or to refute a given model. In this paper we will derive 
preference foundations for the models that underlie the most common ways to measure 
health inequality. 
The literature on the measurement of health inequalities is vast and rapidly 
growing and has benefited from contributions from a number of disciplinary 
perspectives.1 Economists have made substantial contributions to the empirical literature 
on this subject, thereby often drawing on the accumulated knowledge in the field of 
income inequality measurement. Le Grand (1989) and Le Grand and Rabin (1986) have 
proposed the use of the Gini coefficient for the measurement of pure inequality in 
mortality. Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, and Paci (1989) have proposed the use of the 
concentration index for the measurement of relative socioeconomic inequality in health 
and health care. More recently, van Doorslaer and Jones (2003) and Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer (2004) have drawn attention to the simple relationship between both types of 
rank-dependent health inequality measures, while Koolman and van Doorslaer (2004) 
have illustrated the redistribution interpretation of the concentration index. Wagstaff, van 
Doorslaer, and Watanabe (2003) have shown how the concentration index can be 
decomposed by sources, and Clarke, Gerdtham, and Connelly (2003) have illustrated its 
decomposition by components. Clarke et al. (2002) have shown that inequality 
                                                 
1 Early reviews include Wagstaff, Paci and Van Doorslaer (1991) and Mackenbach and Kunst (1997). A 
recent review is  Regidor (2004). 
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comparisons based on absolute and relative inequality measures need not coincide. 
Finally, building on results obtained by Yitzhaki (1983) and Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984), 
Wagstaff (2002) has made the implicit weighting of individuals’ health states in the 
concentration index more explicit, and has proposed the use of a so-called achievement 
index to simultaneously embody concerns about the mean and the degree of inequality of 
a health distribution.  
While a welfare economics foundation for the measurement of income inequality 
and the comparison of income distributions has long been provided (Kolm, 1969, 
Atkinson, 1970, Lambert, 2001, Dutta, 2002), such a foundation has so far been lacking 
for the proposed measures of health inequality. Stecklov and Bommier (2002) have 
explored how the Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) approach to measuring multi-
dimensional inequality (e.g. in income and mortality) could be used to provide a welfare 
economics foundation for health inequality measurement and arrived at a negative 
conclusion. They restricted attention, however, to a specific notion of a just or equitable 
distribution of health, namely equality of access (see p.502) and their negative 
conclusions are a consequence of this notion. The commonly used measures of health 
inequality are based on a different notion of equity, namely equality of health.2 Fleurbaey 
(2005a) has justified the use of the concentration curve for health by interpreting it as a 
component in the decomposition of the Lorenz curve for welfare. 
This paper takes a different route than Stecklov and Bommier (2002) and 
Fleurbaey (2005a) by demonstrating how some conditions for preference relations can 
                                                 
2 For a criticism of equality of access as a notion of equity see Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) and  Fleurbaey 
(2005a). 
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usefully be applied to provide a welfare economics foundation for the commonly used 
measures of inequality in health. It draws on the work by Bleichrodt, Diecidue, and 
Quiggin (2004) to characterize the rank-dependent QALY model and on some results that 
have been derived in the theoretical literature on inequality measurement. By providing 
such a general preference foundation we hope that our paper will clarify what 
assumptions are implicit in the adoption of a particular measure.  
In what follows, Section 2 describes the main measures of health inequality. 
Section 3 gives a preference foundation for these measures. We characterize the Gini 
index, the concentration index, and Wagstaff’s (2002) achievement index. We also 
briefly discuss the extension of our techniques to characterize and design absolute 
measures of health inequality. Section 4, which concludes the paper, discusses the appeal 
of the conditions introduced throughout the paper and, hence, of the measures that they 
characterize, and considers possible extensions and generalizations. All proofs are in the 
appendix. 
 
2. Measures of health inequality  
The literature on the measurement of inequalities in health has drawn on the development 
of rank-dependent measures in the income inequality literature. A long-standing issue in 
the literature on health inequality is whether all inequalities ought to be measured or only 
those which show some systematic association with indicators of socioeconomic status 
(Gakidou, Murray, and Frenk, 2000, Wagstaff, 2001) Some of the earlier contributions by 
economists (e.g. LeGrand, 1989) used Lorenz curves and the Gini index to measure 
inequality in mortality rates. A Lorenz curve describes the cumulative distribution of 
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health in a population ranked by health and the Gini index, henceforth denoted as G, 
measures the deviation from an equal distribution as (twice) the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the diagonal.  
Wagstaff, Paci, and van Doorslaer (1991) proposed to use the related concepts of 
a concentration curve and index to measure the extent to which inequalities in health are 
related to indicators of socioeconomic status like income or education.  They argued that 
the concentration index meets three minimal requirements of an inequality index: (i) it 
reflects the experience of the entire population studied, (ii) it reflects the socioeconomic 
dimension of health inequalities, and (iii) it is sensitive to changes in the composition of 
the underlying socioeconomic ranking variable. A concentration curve describes the 
cumulative distribution of health in a population ranked by socioeconomic status and the 
concentration index, henceforth denoted as C, measures the deviation from an equal 
distribution as (twice) the area between the concentration curve and the diagonal. 
The Gini index G can only take positive values and becomes zero when the 
Lorenz curve coincides with the diagonal. A Lorenz curve can only lie below the 
diagonal. The concentration index C can be both negative and positive depending on 
whether the concentration curve lies above or below the diagonal.  For individual-level 
data, both the Gini and the concentration coefficient can be written as: 
 
1 − ∑
n
i=1(2Ri−1)hi
n2μ(h)  .         (1)   
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where n is the sample size, hi is the health indicator for person i that is larger the better is 
health, μ(h) is the mean level of health, and Ri is the relative rank of the ith person, where 
1 means best rank or “best-off”.3 For the Gini index the ranking is in terms of health, for 
the concentration index the ranking is in terms of socioeconomic status. 
Equation (1) shows that the weighting scheme and degree of inequality aversion 
embodied in the concentration index is arbitrary. Drawing on Yitzhaki's (1983) extended 
Gini coefficient, Wagstaff (2002) proposed an extended concentration index which, for 
the purposes of this paper, is most conveniently defined as  
 
C(ν) = 1 − Ê
n
i=1 (Ri
ν − (Ri−1)ν)hi
 nν μ(h)  ,      (2) 
 
where ranking is by socioeconomic status. The parameter ν reflects distributional 
sensitivity. When ν = 1, everyone’s health is weighted equally and inequality, as 
measured by (2), equals zero, irrespective of how unequal the distribution of health is 
across socioeconomic groups. For ν > 1, a larger weight is attached to a worse-ranked 
person’s health than to a better-ranked person’s health and, thus, there is some aversion to 
inequality.  If ν = 2 then (2) reduces to (1) and becomes equal to the standard 
concentration index. As ν gets larger, the weighting becomes more pro-poor. If ν = ∞ 
then (2) becomes 1 − mini hi μ(h) , i.e. all weight goes to the worst-ranked individual.  
                                                 
3 In the empirical literature it is more common to let 1 mean worst rank. Obviously this is just a matter of 
convention. The notation in what follows is, we believe, easier if we let 1 denote best rank. 
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Wagstaff (2002) went on to propose what he labeled an achievement index, which 
in the notation of this paper is defined as 
 
A(ν) = Ê
n
i=1 (Ri
ν − (Ri−1)ν)hi
 nν  .       (3) 
 
A comparison between (2) and (3) reveals immediately that A(ν) = μ(h)(1−C(ν)). 
The latter expression bears a striking resemblance to an abbreviated social welfare 
function that is quite common in the income inequality measurement literature. Lambert 
(2001) has given several welfare economics rationalizations for the use of an abbreviated 
social welfare function in the evaluation of income profiles. His approach is different 
from ours in that he did not give preference foundations for functional forms, but, instead, 
assumed particular functional forms. 
 
3. A theoretical foundation for rank-dependent inequality measures  
We will now examine the preference conditions that underlie the inequality 
measures introduced in Section 2. For ease of exposition, it is useful to start with 
comparisons of health distributions across populations with a fixed size before 
considering the case of variable population sizes.  
 
3.1. Fixed population size 
We consider a policy maker who has to make a choice between distributions of 
health for a population of fixed size n ≥ 2. Let hi denote the amount of health of 
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individual i. A health profile (h1,…,hn) specifies the health of each individual in society. 
Amounts of health are nonnegative real numbers and, hence, health profiles are elements 
of IRn+.
4 The policy maker’s preferences over health profiles are expressed by a preference 
relation í, denoting “at least as preferred as”. As usual, ê denotes strict preference and ~ 
denotes indifference. The preference ordering over health profiles does not depend on 
other variables such as the level of consumption. This is a consequence of the fact that the 
purpose of the paper is to characterize common measures of health inequality and these 
measures depend only on health and not on other variables. The restrictiveness of the 
assumption that we can focus on health alone, which is implicit in these measures, will 
become apparent when we discuss the conditions that we introduce next. 
We assume that the relation í is a weak order, i.e. it is complete (for all health 
profiles h,h′, either h í h′ or h′ í h or both) and transitive (if h í h′ and h′ í h′′ then h í 
h′′). We also assume that í satisfies monotonicity: if health profiles h and h′ are such that 
each individual in society has more health under h than under h′, then h should be 
preferred to h′. Formally, if for all i in {1,…,n} hi > h′i then h ê h′. Further, we assume 
that for each health profile h there exists an equally-distributed equivalent e, that is, a 
constant level of health, which, if received by each individual, results in a distribution 
that is socially indifferent to h: (e,….,e) ~ (h1,…,hn). 
Under the assumptions made, there exists a social welfare function W that 
represents í: for all health profiles h,h′, W(h) ≥ W(h′) if and only if h í h′. For a proof of 
                                                 
4 The set of health levels can also be a subset of the reals. In applications this subset  is often [0,1]n. 
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this assertion see the proof of Theorem 1. The equally distributed equivalent e 
corresponding to a given health profile h is then given by 
 
W(e,…,e) = W(h1,….,hn).       (4) 
 
 Under the assumptions made, (4) can be solved uniquely for e and we can write 
 
 e = F(h),         (5) 
 
where F denotes the functional relationship between e and h. By monotonicity, it follows 
that for all health profiles h,h′, W(h) ≥ W(h′) if and only if F(h) ≥ F(h′). Hence, W and F 
both represent í and they must be related by a positive monotonic transformation. 
 The concern with inequality stems primarily from the feeling that reductions in 
inequality should lead to increases in social welfare, provided that mean health remains 
constant. Given any health profile h, we can define an index of inequality I(h) as the 
proportion of total health that can be discarded without affecting social welfare. This is 
the methodology associated with Atkinson (1970), Kolm (1969), and Sen (1973) (AKS). 
See Dutta (2002) for an overview. In our decision context, this means that  
 
e = μ(h)(1 − I(h)).         (6) 
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Equation (6) implies that social welfare is a positive monotonic transformation of μ(h)(1 
− I(h)). From (6) we obtain that an AKS index of inequality for the social welfare 
function W is given by  
 
I(h) = 1 − eμ(h) ,        (7) 
 
Every AKS index of inequality is normatively significant in the sense that for every two 
health profiles h and h′ that have the same mean level of health, I(h) ≤ I(h′) if and only if 
W(h) ≥ W(h′).  
 We can use the general framework outlined above to analyze the value judgments 
implied by health inequality measures. We will do this first for the Gini index and then 
for the concentration index.  
 
Gini index 
A rank-ordered health profile 
~
h is a permutation of h such that 
~
h1 is the health of 
the individual with the best health status, 
~
hi the health of the individual who has rank i in 
the distribution of health status, and 
~
hn the health of the individual who has the worst 
health status. Using this notation, (1) shows that the Gini index is defined as  
 
G = 1 − 
~
h1 +…+ (2i−1) ~hi +…+ (2n−1) ~hn
n2μ(h)  .     (8) 
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By (7) G = 1 − eμ(h)  and, thus, by (5) G = 1 − 
F(h)
μ(h) . Because the sum of the first n 
odd numbers (1+3+…+(2i−1)+…+(2n−1)) equals n2, (8) yields  
 
G = 1 − 
~
h1 +…+ (2i−1) ~hi +…+ (2n−1) ~hn
1 + ….+ (2i−1) + ….+ (2n−1)  
μ(h)       (9) 
 
and, thus, we obtain that the social welfare function underlying the Gini index is equal to 
 
F(h) = 
~
h1 +…+ (2i−1) ~hi +…+ (2n−1) ~hn
1 + ….+ (2i−1) + ….+ (2n−1)  .     (10) 
 
As noted, the coefficients in (10) are arbitrary and we, therefore, start by characterizing a 
more general index, which we label the generalized Gini index: 
 
F(h) = 
a1
~
h1 +…+ an
~
hn
 a1 + ….+ an   = 
Ê
n
i=1 ai
~
hi
 Ê
n
i=1 ai
 ,      (11) 
 
where, for monotonicity, ai > 0, i = 1,…,n. Equation (11) is an adaptation of Weymark's 
(1981) generalized Gini index to our decision context. 
Besides the requirement that they are positive, we have imposed no other 
restrictions on the weights ai. Intuitively, we would like the weights to increase with the 
individual’s ranking position to reflect that more weight is given to individuals who are 
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worse-off. The following condition ensures this. The  principle of health transfers holds 
if a transfer of health from someone who is in better health to someone who is in worse 
health does not lead to a reduction in social welfare provided the transfer does not change 
the ranking of the individuals in terms of health.5 6  
We will now formalize the principle of health transfers. It will be convenient in 
the subsequent discussion to consider the set K = {h: h1 ≥…≥ hn}. That is, K contains all 
health profiles such that the individual with index number j also has rank j in terms of 
health. So if there are three (groups of) individuals in society (n = 3) then the health 
profile (0.8, 0.5, 0.2) belongs to K, but the profile (0.5, 0.8, 0.6) does not. Let αih denote 
the health profile h with hi replaced by α: αih = (h1,…, hi−1,α, hi+1,…, hn). That is, αih is 
the health profile that obtains when the health of individual i is changed from hi to α, 
while leaving the health of all other individuals unaffected. Similarly, αiβjh is the health 
profile h with hi replaced by α and hj by β. Let 0 denote the vector of zero health for all 
individuals. The principle of health transfers holds if for all h∈K, for all i < j, and for all 
α > 0, h + (−α)iαj0 ∈ K implies h + (−α)iαj0 í h. The requirement that h + (−α)iαj0 ∈ K 
reflects that the transfer should not change the ranking of the individuals in terms of 
health. A consequence of the principle of health transfers is that a1 ≤….≤ an in (11). The 
principle of health transfers is similar to Yaari's (1988) condition of equality-mindedness 
applied to the health domain. 
                                                 
5 We discuss the acceptability of this principle in the final section. 
6 That health transfers are in practice generally not possible is not relevant here. What matters is that more 
equal health profiles are preferred to less equal health profiles. We used the term “transfers” because it is 
common in the literature on inequality measurement. 
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 Anonymity holds if for all health profiles h, h′, if h is a permutation of h′ then h ~ 
h′. So if n = 3, anonymity implies, for example, that (0.8,0.6,0.3) ~ (0.3,0.8,0.6), because 
the latter profile is a permutation of the first. In words, anonymity says that it does not 
matter who gets which health state; the identity of the individuals does not matter. This 
also implies that individual characteristics like gender, age, occupation etc. should not 
influence social welfare judgments according to anonymity. The only characteristic that 
is relevant is the individual’s health. 
Finally, we assume that if h,h′, and h′′ are all in K, then h í h′ if and only if h+h′′ 
í h′+h′′. We will refer to this condition as additivity. Additivity means, for instance, that 
if there are two (groups of) individuals in society and h = (0.5,0.5) ê (0.8,0.2) = h′ then 
also (0.7,0.5) ê (1.0,0.2). Adding h′′ = (0.2,0) to both h and h′ does not affect preferences 
because h, h′, and h′′ are all such that the first individual gets at least as much health as 
the second. Additivity does not claim that if, h = (0.5,0.5) ê (0.8,0.2) = h′ then also 
(0.5,0.7) ê (0.8,0.4), because now h′′ = (0,0.2) is such that the second individual gets 
more health than the first, whereas in h and h′ the first individual gets at least as much as 
the second. Hence, h and h′ are in K, but h′′ is not. 
  We can now state a first result. 
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Theorem 1: The following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) F(h) satisfies (11) with 0 < a1 ≤….≤ an. 
(ii) í is a weak order that satisfies monotonicity, the principle of health transfers, 
anonymity, and additivity and there exists for each health profile an equally distributed 
equivalent level of health. 
¸ 
 
To obtain (10), i.e. the social welfare function underlying the Gini index, we replace the 
principle of health transfers by the following condition: for all h∈K, for all j, and for all 
α > 0,  h + (−(2j−1)α)1αj0 ∈ K implies h + (−(2j−1)α)1αj0 ~ h. We will refer to this 
condition as the Gini condition. In the definition of the Gini condition the subscript 1 
refers to the individual who is best-off in terms of health. The Gini condition specifies the 
trade-off in units of health between the best-off individual and any other individual that 
leaves the policy maker indifferent. The requirement that h + (−(2j−1)α)1αj0 ∈ K reflects 
that the health transfer should not change the rank-ordering of the individuals in terms of 
health. The Gini condition implies for example that h = (0.8, 0.4) ~ (0.5, 0.5). In this 
example α = 0.1.  
Note that the Gini condition is stronger than the principle of health transfers. The 
Gini condition implies the principle of health transfers given the other conditions in 
Theorem 1. The principle of health transfers, however, does not imply the Gini condition: 
the principle of health transfers does not imply the indifference h + (−(2j−1)α)1αj0 ~ h. It 
only says that h + (−α)1αj0 í h whenever h and h + (−α)1αj0 both belong to K. Hence, 
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the Gini condition can be interpreted as a stronger or more restrictive version of the 
principle of health transfers. 
 To summarize,  
 
Theorem 2: The following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) F(h) satisfies (10) 
(ii) í is a weak order that satisfies monotonicity, the Gini condition, anonymity, and 
additivity and there exists for each health profile an equally distributed equivalent level of 
health. 
¸ 
 
Concentration Index 
The characterization of the concentration index resembles the characterization of 
the Gini index. To avoid introducing extra notation, we will, with two exceptions, use the 
same names for the various conditions as we used above instead of distinguishing 
between the Gini and the concentration index version of the condition. The context in 
which a condition is used will clarify which version of a condition is meant. 
To characterize the concentration index we should define í over profiles of 
vectors h = ((h1,R1),…,(hn,Rn)), where Ri denotes individual i’s rank in terms of 
socioeconomic status. A rank-ordered health profile 
~
h is now such that 
~
h1 is the health of 
the individual with the highest socioeconomic status, 
~
hi the health of the individual who 
has rank i in the distribution of socioeconomic status, and 
~
hn the health of the individual 
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who has the lowest socioeconomic status. Using this notation, (1) shows that the 
concentration-index is defined as  
 
C = 1 − 
~
h1 +…+ (2i−1) ~hi +…+ (2n−1) ~hn
n2μ(h)  .     (12) 
 
And, thus, by a similar line of argument as in the derivation of (10), the social welfare 
function underlying the concentration index is equal to  
 
F(h) = 
~
h1 +…+ (2i−1) ~hi +…+ (2n−1) ~hn
1 + ….+ (2i−1) + ….+ (2n−1)  .     (13) 
 
The generalized concentration index is defined as 
 
F(h) = 
a1
~
h1 +…+ an
~
hn
 a1 + ….+ an   = 
Ê
n
i=1 ai
~
hi
 Ê
n
i=1 ai
 ,      (14) 
 
where, for monotonicity, ai > 0, i = 1,…,n.  
To ensure that the ai decrease with the individual’s ranking position, we impose 
the following principle of income-related health transfers: transferring health from 
someone who is better-off in terms of socioeconomic status to someone who is worse-off 
in terms of socioeconomic status does not lead to a reduction in social welfare provided 
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the transfer does not change the ranking of the individuals in terms of socioeconomic 
status.  
To formalize the principle of income-related health transfers, let Kid be the set of 
health profiles such that the numbering of the individuals corresponds to their rank in 
terms of socioeconomic status: h1 is the health of the individual with the highest 
socioeconomic status, hi is the health of the individual who has rank i in terms of 
socioeconomic status and hn is the health of the individual with the worst socioeconomic 
status. That is, Kid = {h: R1 <…< Rn}. The principle of income-related health transfers 
holds if for all h∈Kid, for all i < j, and for all α > 0, h + (−α)iαj0 ∈ Kid implies h + 
(−α)iαj0 í h. The requirement that h + (−α)iαj0 ∈ Kid reflects that the health transfer 
should not affect the rank ordering of the individuals in terms of socioeconomic status. 
 Anonymity holds if for all profiles h = ((h1,R1),…,(hn,Rn)), h′ = ((h′1,R′1),…,(h′n,R′n
)), if h is a permutation of h′, where health status and socioeconomic rank are permuted 
jointly, then h ~ h′. Anonymity implies, for instance, that ((0.8,1),(0.4,2),(0.6,3)) ~ 
((0.4,2),(0.6,3),(0.8,1)). According to anonymity, the only characteristics that are allowed 
to influence social welfare judgments are the individual’s health and his rank in terms of 
socioeconomic status. Finally, we assume additivity: if h,h′, and h′′ are all in Kid, then h í 
h′ if and only if h+h′′ í h′+h′′. We can now characterize the generalized concentration 
index. 
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Theorem 3: The following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) F(h) satisfies (14) with 0 < a1 ≤….≤ an. 
(ii) í is a weak order that satisfies monotonicity, the principle of income-related health 
transfers, anonymity, and additivity and there exists for each health profile an equally 
distributed equivalent level of health. 
¸ 
 
To obtain (13), the social welfare function underlying the concentration index, we replace 
the principle of income-related health transfers by the following condition: for all h∈Kid, 
for all j, and for all α > 0,  h + (−(2j−1)α)1αj0 ∈ Kid implies h + (−(2j−1)α)1αj0 ~ h. We 
will refer to this condition as the CI condition. The CI condition specifies a trade-off 
between the individual that is best-off in terms of socioeconomic status and any other 
individual in society that leaves the policy maker indifferent. The CI condition is a 
stronger condition than the principle of income-related health transfers: the CI condition 
implies the principle of income-related health transfers, but the principle of income-
related health transfers does not imply the CI condition. 
 
Theorem 4: The following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) F(h) satisfies (13) 
(ii) í is a weak order that satisfies monotonicity, the CI condition, anonymity, and 
additivity and there exists for each health profile an equally distributed equivalent level of 
health. 
¸ 
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3.2. Variable population size 
 In Section 3.1. the population size was held fixed. We will now generalize the 
results of the previous subsection to the case where the population size is variable. A 
complication if we allow for variable population size is that the weights ai in (11) and 
(14) depend on the population size n. A natural restriction is to assume that the ai are 
independent of n and can be characterized by a single nondecreasing sequence {a1, 
a2,…}. For example, for the Gini index or the concentration index this sequence would 
have to be {1,3,5,7,……}. Using the terminology of Donaldson and Weymark (1980) we 
refer to (11) with the assumption that the ai are independent of n as the single-series Gini 
model and to (14) with the assumption that the ai are independent of n as the single-series 
CI model. 
 Let h be a given health profile. We call h
m
 an m-fold replication of h if h
m
 = 
(h
(1)
,…, h
(m)
) where each h
(i)
 = h. For example, if h = (h1,h2) then its 2-fold replication h(2) 
= (h1,h2,h1,h2). In the case of the concentration index, replication also concerns 
socioeconomic status and h(2) = ((h1,R1),(h2,R2),(h1,R1),(h2,R2)). The principle of 
population, introduced by Dalton (1920), requires that social welfare for a population of 
size n is the same as social welfare for a population of size mn if the larger population is 
an m-fold replication of the smaller population. Formally, for all m, if h
m
 is an m-fold 
replication of h then h ~ h
m
. Intuitively, the principle of population claims that only per-
capita quantities matter.  
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Theorem 5. Suppose that the single-series Gini model (single-series CI model) holds. 
Then the following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) F(h) = 
Ê
n
i=1 (i
ν − (i−1)ν) ~hi
 nν   where the ranking is in terms of health (socioeconomic 
status).  
(ii) í satisfies the principle of population  
¸ 
 
Theorem 5 shows that under the single-series CI model the principle of population 
implies Wagstaff’s (2002) achievement index, which is, in fact, the abbreviated social 
welfare function underlying his extended concentration index. As noted in Section 2, the 
parameter ν captures distributional concerns; the higher ν, the more sensitive the policy 
maker is to the distribution of health. If we replace the principle of health transfers (the 
principle of income-related health transfers) in the single-series Gini model (single-series 
CI model) by the Gini condition (CI condition) then we obtain a preference foundation 
for the Gini index (concentration index) for variable population size. 
 In the preceding discussion, we focused on relative measures of health inequality. 
The above analysis can also be used to give a preference foundation for absolute 
measures of health inequality. Absolute measures of health inequality are defined by  
 
IA(h) = μ(h) − F(h).        (15) 
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Thus Theorem 5 can be used to define an absolute measure of health inequality that 
corresponds to Wagstaff’s (2002) achievement index. 
 
4. Discussion 
In this paper we have discussed under what conditions a welfare economics foundation 
can be given to the largely empirical literature on the measurement of health inequality. 
The conditions of anonymity, the existence of an equally distributed equivalent level of 
health, weak ordering, and monotonicity generally seem acceptable. Sen (1973) has 
argued that completeness may be too restrictive given that many of our intuitions on 
inequality only support partial orderings. Monotonicity may in some cases be too 
restrictive, e.g. when health in society is concentrated among few people a policy maker 
may not consider it desirable to give these “happy few” a large gain in health when the 
health of the others in society, the “left-behinds”, improves only marginally. Such 
decision situations will be rare, however, and empirical evidence does not seem to 
support such preferences (Bleichrodt, Doctor, and Stolk, 2005). Therefore, monotonicity 
does not seem restrictive as a general principle. Finally, anonymity may be violated if the 
policy maker cares about other attributes of an individual than only his health and his 
socioeconomic status.  
 Additivity is more controversial. It is sometimes observed that societies become 
more sensitive to inequalities when they grow richer and the same may be true for health. 
When the total level of health is low, inequalities in health may not be important. As 
societies become healthier, the concern for inequalities in health may increase. If this 
were to happen, violations of additivity may arise. Consider the following example where 
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there are two (groups of) individuals and health is measured on the scale [0,1]. It may be 
that a policy maker prefers (0.5,0.1) to (0.3,0.3) because then at least one individual has a 
reasonable quality of life. However, the policy maker may also prefer (0.8,0.8) to 
(1.0,0.6), because the former is more equitable and all individuals have a reasonable 
quality of life. These two preferences violate additivity because (0.8,0.8) = (0.3,0.3) + 
(0.5,0.5) and (1.0,0.6) = (0.5,0.1) + (0.5,0.5). That said, we believe that in most real-
world decision contexts additivity will not be violated and, hence, we tend to consider 
additivity a plausible condition. 
 Doubts may be raised about the validity of the principle of population. If only the 
health of people is replicated, but not other characteristics like consumption and income 
can we really say social welfare is the same in the original situation and in the m-fold 
replication? We are inclined to answer this question in the negative.  
 Let us finally turn to the principle of (income-related) health transfers.  The 
principle of health transfers, used in the characterization of the generalized Gini index, 
says that transferring health from someone with higher health to someone with lower 
health does not lead to a reduction in social welfare provided the transfer does not change 
the health ranking of the individuals. One may object against this that it is not always 
desirable to transfer health from a healthier person to a less healthy person, e.g. when the 
healthier person is poor and the less healthy person is rich. The principle of income-
related health transfers, which is the socioeconomic inequalities version of the principle 
of health transfers and which was used in the characterization of the generalized 
concentration index, requires that transferring health from someone who is better-off in 
terms of socioeconomic status to someone who is worse-off does not lead to a reduction 
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in social welfare provided the transfer does not change the ranking of the individuals in 
terms of socioeconomic status. The plausibility of this principle is contestable. It does not 
seem desirable to transfer health from a person with high living standards to a person 
with lower living standards when the person with high living standards is in poor health 
and differences in living standards are small. In general, the principle of health transfers 
will, both in its pure inequalities version and in its socioeconomic inequalities version, be 
more acceptable the stronger the correlation between health and other attributes such as 
income. The Gini condition and the CI condition, the stronger versions of the principle of 
health transfers and the principle of income-related health transfers, respectively, seem 
arbitrary and the equity weights implied by these conditions will not meet with 
unanimous approval. 
 The above observations on the principle of population and the principle of 
(income-related) health transfers suggest that it may be desirable to study multivariate 
concepts of inequality: the policy maker generally cares not only about the distribution of 
health, but also about the distribution of other attributes, e.g. income, educational 
attainment, etc. To characterize health inequality measures in such a setting requires that 
additional assumptions be imposed. In particular, we should assume that the social 
decision maker’s preferences over the various attributes are separable in the attributes. 
Also, the conditions imposed in Section 3 should be rephrased in a multidimensional 
setting, which raises complications for the formulation of the principle of (income-
related) health transfers and additivity. The translation of the other conditions is 
straightforward. Theoretical treatments of multidimensional inequality measurement have 
been provided by Tsui (1995) and Gajdos and Weymark (2005) but we are not aware of 
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any empirical applications other than the initial attempt of Atkinson and Bourguignon 
(1982) to illustrate their dominance conditions for the comparison of inequality in two 
dimensions (per capita incomes and life expectancy).  
Fleurbaey (2005b) circumvented the problem of the existence of multiple 
attributes by reducing what is basically a two-dimensional problem (both health and 
income matter) to a one-dimensional problem. He introduced the concept of “healthy-
equivalent consumption”. This is basically equal to the individual’s income minus his 
willingness to pay for perfect health. By converting the health dimension into an income 
dimension, Fleurbaey rephrased the two-dimensional problem into the income space and 
then the usual conditions for a social welfare function defined over distributions of 
income apply. In that sense, the results of Section 3 can also be applied to Fleurbaey’s 
rephrased problem.  
 
Appendix: Proofs. 
Proof of Theorem 1.  
That (i) implies (ii) is easy to verify. Hence, we assume (ii) and derive (i). First we show 
that e(h), the equally distributed equivalent of health profile h, represents í. Consider two 
health profiles h and h′ and let e and e′ be their corresponding equally distributed 
equivalents, which exist by assumption. If h í h′ then e1 ~ h í h′ ~ e′1, where 1 denotes 
the n-dimensional unit vector. By transitivity, we have e í e′ and, hence, by monotonicity 
e ≥ e′. Conversely, if e ≥ e′, then by monotonicity e í e′ and by transitivity h í h′. Hence, 
e represents í and we can define a social welfare function W(h) = e(h). 
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We next show that e(h) satisfies Cauchy’s functional equation: e(h+h′) = e(h) + 
e(h′), whenever h and h′ are in K = {h1 ≥…≥ hn}. Let h, h′∈K. Note that for all h, e(h) is 
in K. The indifference h ~ e(h) implies by additivity that h + h′ ~ e(h) + h′. Additivity and 
h′ ~ e(h′) imply that e(h) + h′ ~ e(h) + e(h′). Transitivity gives h + h′ ~ e(h) + e(h′). 
Hence, e(h + h′) = e(h) + e(h′). This and monotonicity imply by a similar line of proof as 
in Lemma 3 and Theorem 4 in Weymark (1981) that e(h) is linear: e(h) = Ê
n
i=1λihi. 
Weymark (1981) assumed continuity of e, but his proof also holds if monotonicity is 
assumed instead (see the argument in Aczel 1966, p.33). Because e(1) = 1, it follows that 
the λi sum to one. By monotonicity the λi are all positive. By the principle of health 
transfers it follows that λi ≤ λj when i<j. 
Now consider h not in K. Let 
~
h be a permutation of h such that 
~
h∈K. By 
anonymity, h ~ 
~
h and, hence, we can define e(h) = Ê
n
i=1λi 
~
hi. Choosing ai such that λi = 
ai
Ê
n
i=1ai
  gives the desired result. 
¸ 
 
Proof of Theorem 2. 
(i) ⇒ (ii) is immediate. Suppose (ii). By the proof of Theorem 1 we obtain that h í h′ ⇔ 
Ê
n
i=1λi 
~
hi ≥ Ê
n
i=1λi 
~
h′i. Let a1 = 1. By the Gini condition it follows immediately that ai = 
(2i−1). Hence, (10) represents í. 
¸ 
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Proof of Theorem 3. 
(i) ⇒ (ii) is immediate. Suppose (ii). For h∈Kid, the same line of proof as was used in the 
proof of Theorem 1 yields that Ê
n
i=1λihi represents í. If h is not in K and 
~
h is a 
permutation of h such that 
~
h∈Kid, then by anonymity, h ~ ~h. The rest of the proof is 
identical to the proof of Theorem 1. 
¸ 
 
Proof of Theorem 4. 
(i) ⇒ (ii) is immediate. The proof that (ii) ⇒ (i) is identical to the proof of Theorem 2. 
¸ 
 
Proof of Theorem 5. 
 That (i) implies (ii) is easy to verify. Assume that the principle of population 
holds. Assume that either the single-series Gini model or the single-series CI model 
holds. Define the function f by 
 
         f(0) = 0             
         f(m) = Ê
m
i=1ai, m∈IN   .          
 
It follows that ai = f(i) − f(i−1). By the principle of health transfers or the principle of 
income-related health transfers, f(n+1) − f(n) ≥ f(n) − f(n−1) for all n∈IN. It now follows 
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from the proof of Theorems 1 and 2 in Donaldson and Weymark (1980) that f(n) = nν for 
all n∈IN. Substitution gives (i).  
¸ 
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